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 A discussion is going on in cognitive science about the use of representations to explain 
how intelligent behavior is generated. In the traditional view, an organism is thought to 
incorporate representations. These provide an internal model that is used by the 
organism to instruct the motor apparatus so that the adaptive and anticipatory 
characteristics of behavior come about. So-called interactionists claim that this 
representational specification of behavior raises more problems than that it solves. In 
their view, the notion of internal representational models is to be dispensed with. 
Instead, behavior is to be explained as the intricate interaction between an embodied 
organism and the specific make up of an environment. The problem with a non-
representational interactive account is that it has severe difficulties with anticipatory, 
future oriented behavior. The present paper extends the interactionist conceptual 
framework by drawing on ideas derived from the study of morphogenesis. This 
extended interactionist framework is based on an analysis of anticipatory behavior as a 
process which involves multiple spatio-temporal scales of neural, bodily and 
environmental dynamics. This extended conceptual framework provides the outlines for 
an explanation of anticipatory behavior without involving a representational 




1. Representational specification versus organism-environment interaction. 
How does the adaptive and anticipatory behavior of humans and animals come about? Cognitive 
science's usual way of dealing with this problem involves representational specifications: a cognitive 
system is supposed to incorporate a set of representations which bear an abstract isomorphism to—and 
so models—the external situation and the system's situation therein. This provides the cognitive system 
with a model which allows it to anticipate and evaluate the consequences of various behaviors under 
differing circumstances (Rosen, 1979, 1987). An action can then be selected on the basis of the model's 
predictions, providing the system with a predefined goal state. After that the model will act as a program 
instructing the motor apparatus to perform a sequence of movements which will bring about the 
anticipated goal state. Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea. The box on the left contains the desired state of 
affairs, the one on the right the state of affairs in the world. Both boxes are described in the same 
vocabulary, e.g. `John wants to drink some water' on the left leads to the behavior `John drinks some 
water' on the right. In this perspective, behavior is conceptualized as the execution of a pre-programmed 
set of instructions which will lead to the attainment of a pre-defined goal-state. It is not intrinsically 
different from translating the stored information on a compact disc into sound waves. Whether these 
representational specifications are present in symbolical form or e.g. as distributed network states does 
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not make much difference here. In both cases, a representation of what is to be done is present and used 
to instruct the motor system. The conceptual framework used remains the same (Keijzer & Bem, 1996). 
 
   === Insert Figure 1 about here === 
 
 Recently an alternative explanation for adaptive behavior has come to the fore. Instead of 
conceptualizing the outward behavior of humans and animals as the output of an intelligent cognitive 
system, this alternative explanation stresses the importance of the embodiment of the behaving agent as 
well as the environment in which the behavior takes place (Beer, 1990; Brooks, 1991a, 1991b; Meyer & 
Wilson, 1991). This so-called interactionist approach states that behavior is to be explained as a result of 
the fine-grained interactions between a nervous system, the body it is located in and the environment in 
which the body is situated. Together these ingredients make up one single encompassing organism-
environment interaction system (Beer, 1990; Smithers, 1994), a term that will here be shortened to 
behavioral system (Keijzer & Bem, 1996). The interactionist approach has proven to be quite successful 
in robotics (Brooks, 1989). It is also closely associated with a more dynamical approach to behavior and 
cognition (Beer, 1992; Van Gelder, 1992; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995).1 
 The interactionist approach tends to downplay and sometimes even to deny altogether the use of 
representations as a necessary part of an explanation for the generation of adaptive behavior (Brooks, 
1991a; 1991b; Van Gelder, 1992). The notion of representation to which these authors are opposed 
seems to be relatively specific: an internal modeling capacity which replicates the external 
environmental structure and which is supposed to be used by the cognitive system to guide its behavior 
in relative independence from the immediate environment (Keijzer, 1997). 
 An interactionist account is clearly capable of modelling comparatively simple adaptive 
behavior without such internal world-models or representations (Meyer & Wilson, 1991; Cliff, 
Husbands, Meyer & Wilson, 1994). Operational models of behaving systems based on interactionist 
principles exist and an example will be discussed below. The behavior accounted for by these models 
remains relatively simple however. The limiting factor seems to be that the environment has to provide 
enough context for the organism to show appropriate behavior. As long as this is the case, 
representational specification can be dispensed with. 
 The real challenge lies with anticipatory behavior. Anticipatory behavior is behavior which 
involves internal factors which `lead' or `guide' the behavior towards attaining specific, future goal-
states. Anticipatory behavior, occurring in the here and now, is not only constrained by the immediate 
environment, but also—in some way—by the to-be-achieved, future state of events. As said, this is the 
reason for involving representational elements in a behavioral theory in the first place. For the same 
reason, anticipatory behavior can be considered a so-called representation-hungry problem (Clark, 
1997). 
  Notice that my concern here is only with outwardly observable anticipatory behavior. 
Anticipatory behavior is often interpreted as involving a subjective sense of anticipating a future result, 
or intentions to achieve some goal. The present focus is only on behavior. I will maintain a position 
which is neutral concerning the presence, or lack thereof, of any subjective aspects of anticipatory 
behavior. There is no denial here of the existence of those subjective aspects, nor of their importance. 
There is only the claim that topics relating to subjectivity are not the topic which is addressed at present. 
Anticipatory behavior is strictly interpreted as behavior which is organized on relatively long time-
scales while the proximal environment provides insufficient guidance to account for these long-term 
behavioral patterns. 
 For the discussion between interactionists and proponents of a more traditional, representation-
based explanation, the phenomenon of anticipatory behavior is of prime interest: Could a behavioral 
theory, based on organism-environment interactions alone, ever explain anticipatory behavior? There are 
good reasons why one would prefer an exclusively interactionist account to one which involves 
representational specifications. Within cognitive science, representation is a concept with many 
problems, conceptual as well as practical (Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Shanon, 1993; Pylyshyn, 1987; 
Van Gelder, 1992; Brooks, 1991b). Many of those problems would be avoided if behavior could be 
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explained without invoking representations that specify and instruct the detailed execution of behavior. 
However, formulating a theory of behavior without resorting to representational specification faces 
severe difficulties of its own.  
 In this paper, I will sketch the outlines for an extension of the interactionist account. The key-
idea underlying this extension is that interactionism should focus on the fact that behavior is a multiply-
scaled phenomenon. Behavior involves patterns at many different scales of organization, ranging from 
changes within a neuron's ionic potentials, to spatially and temporally extended actions like `walking to 
Rome'. Similarly, the interaction between organism and environment occurs at many different spatio-
temporal scales. I will argue that explicating the relations between these multiple scales of behavior 
offers a conceptualization of organism-environment interactions capable of dealing with the future-
oriented, anticipatory characteristics of behavior. 
 If this approach can be made to work, it will offer a theoretical basis for understanding 
anticipatory behavior without representational specifications instructing the motor apparatus what to do. 
It will remain a point of discussion whether this does away with the need to talk about representation at 
all, as is sometimes claimed by interactionists. The account presented does involve features which allow 
a representational interpretation when seen at a sufficiently large scale. However, the conceptual 
framework which is presented differs from the traditional one in important ways. It abandons the core 
idea which the use of a representation-based system embodies in cognitive science: the general notion 
that behavior is mainly the result of an internal intelligent and knowledgeable system. When this 
message is accepted, the argument about the continuance of the phrase `representation' becomes a 
relatively harmless verbal quibble. 
 The remainder of this paper is divided into three parts. The next section, relates the interactionist 
account of adaptive behavior to the topics of spatio-temporal scale and self-organization. Behavior is 
described as a multiply-scaled, self-organizing phenomenon. The third section extends this picture by 
drawing an analogy with morphogenesis, the development of a germ cell into a full-grown adult 
organism. I will argue that the conceptual framework which is now being developed for morphogenesis 
does provide a theoretical framework along interactionist lines, capable of dealing with anticipatory 
behavior. The final section will discuss some of the implications of this framework for our 




2. Adaptive behavior consists of coordinations between differently-scaled dynamics.The 
interactionist account is based on the idea that behavior is a result of interactions between a neural 
system, a specific sensory and musculo-skeletal embodiment and the environment in which the 
embodied system is situated. Detailed accounts can be found elsewhere (Beer, 1990; Meyer & Wilson, 
1991; Cliff, Husbands, Meyer & Wilson, 1994). Here I will stress only one major point of the approach: 
The neural system does not incorporate a complete set of behavioral instructions which are first imposed 
on the musculo-skeletal system and then on to the environment. Order does not flow from the neural 
system outward. Instead, the neural system uses the order which is already present in the musculo-
skeletal system and the environment. Behavior is subsequently the result of the interactions between the 
pre-existing order in these systems. It consists of the mutual modulation of neural, bodily and 
environmental dynamics. 
 In this section, I will link the interactionist account of behavior explicitly to the topic of scale 
relations. The coordinations between the neural and musculo-skeletal systems and the environment are 
to be understood as relations between several differently-scaled dynamics. Neural happenings take place 
at a smaller scale than movements, which are, in turn, on a smaller scale than the environmental effects 
that result from them. Scale relations provide a good theoretical basis for understanding adaptive 
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2.1 The multiple scales of behavioral organization. 
Philip and Phylis Morrison's picturebook `Powers of Ten' provides a well-known and evocative 
impression of scale. It consists of a sequence of pictures. The book starts with a picture of the universe at 
a scale of approximately 1 billion light-years. Each next picture portrays a part of the previous one, 
magnified by a power of ten. Going from one picture to the next, at first nothing changes very much. 
You see only white dots on a black ground. Then galaxies appear. Zooming in on our own galaxy, again 
only white dots are visible until, finally, earth appears. Here we see a few familiar scenes—a view of 
North-America, Chicago, a picnic on a lakeside, and a hand. As the scale continues to decrease, 
increasingly more microscopic structure is depicted: a lymphocyte, DNA, atoms and, finally, an 
impression of quarks. `Powers of Ten' shows very convincingly that: (a) The scale on which 
observations are made makes a huge difference for what is conceived of as being there. (b) These scales 
correspond to multiple levels of organization which are hierarchically configure, ranging from very big 
to very small. Many scales have their own descriptions and ontology, such as molecules, cells, tissues, 
planets, or galaxies (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). (c) Human observers have good differentiating 
powers at scales with which they are familiar at a day to day basis, but much less so at bigger and 
smaller scales. What remains outside the book is (d), these effects of changes in scale are typically 
related to changes in temporal scale (Allen & Starr, 1982). Larger scaled events usually exist on a longer 
time scale than smaller-scaled events. 
 The message that `what is there' actually consists of many different things—depending on how 
you focus—has often been difficult to digest. The common response is to ask which of the possible 
descriptions is the `real' or `fundamental' one. Heider once said: "The fact of multiple focus furnishes 
philosophy with many of its classical problems. Multiple focus is distasteful to thinking ... It is as if it 
were possible to read the same book in two ways; once by organizing the letter configurations into 
English sentences, and then again by organizing them into German sentences." (Heider, 1959, p.64). 
This distaste also shows in the strong appeal of physical reductionism. According to this view there are 
no real levels. Each level is no more than the sum of its parts, and ultimately a single dynamics should 
suffice to describe everything. Strictly, this would amount to the claim that nothing `really' happens 
except for the most basic physical happenings, quantum events. This is a very high price to pay for a 
non-ambiguous way of carving up the world. Nowadays, for all practical and scientific purposes it is 
generally accepted that the world clusters into multiple levels of organization, without each level being a 
linear derivative of the preceding level (Anderson, 1972; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Weiss, 1971; 
Yates, 1993). This means that there is a scalar hierarchy of natural phenomena in which it does not make 
much sense to ask which one is more `real' or fundamental than the other (Bechtel, 1994). 
 It is one thing to acknowledge that the world is organized along multiple levels. It is quite 
another thing to address the implications of this general organization. Dividing the world in levels is an 
accepted and necessary way to divide scientific labor. It allows scientists to investigate isolated, 
specialized topics. However, as will be discussed below, a multiply-scaled organization is itself a topic 
worth of serious research. This latter aspect of the multi-level world has only fairly recently been turned 
to. It offers a number of interesting explanatory notions that can be used for behavior. 
 An analysis in terms of multiple scales of organization applies well to behavioral phenomena. 
Behavior involves processes that extend over a wide range of spatio-temporal scales, ranging from 
molecular and cellular happenings within the nervous system, to muscle contractions, to relatively 
small-scaled simple behavior, and on to actions which consist of increasingly large spatio-temporal 
patterns, such as the yearly migration of knots which breed on the arctic tundra and spend the rest of the 
season in coastal intertidal areas on the other side of the earth. The interpretation of this kind of 
migrating bird's behavior at any particular time is scale-dependant. The knot's behavior can be described 
as flapping its wings, flying, flying north, or flying towards Lapland. The multiplicity of behavioral 
interpretations is even greater for humans. Take, for example, a person sitting in front of a computer, 
typing. What is he doing? 
Is he alternatively tensing and relaxing muscles in his arms? Yes. Is he moving his fingers up 
and down? Yes. Is he typing strings of symbols? Yes. Is he adding a return instruction 
that he forgot at the end of a subroutine? Yes. Is he writing a program for plotting stock 
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market prices? Yes. Is he making a little extra money for a vacation? Yes. Is he 
justifying his hobby to his family? Yes. (Powers, 1979, p.134) 
Each of these descriptions forms an equally acceptable description of the `same' behavior. The same 
typing movements can be related to diverging sets of environmental happenings. Selling a computer 
program involves a different set of consequent environmental happenings compared to those of the 
vacation which is paid for by the program. These environmental happenings can also vary a great deal in 
the time and space that they involve. For example, moving a finger takes much less time and space then 
justifying a hobby to your family, which involves first making money and subsequently spending it on a 
vacation-trip. 
 Behavior thus involves many different scales. Yet, conceptually, its organization across those 
multiple spatio-temporal scales is not a well-explored territory. One reason is probably the general 
aversion of multiply scaled explanations, mentioned above. A more specific reason comes from the 
practice of using the intentional vocabulary to describe what agents do. Describing the agent and his 
behavior in an intentional language obscures the scale relations involved. The intentional idiom relies on 
a symbolical description of the agent's intentions. Being symbolical, the question of relating small 
processes to large processes does not arise. Intentions have no size. Nor is the size of a symbolical 
expression in any way related to the size of the entity referred to. The word `universe' takes as much 
space as the word `molecule'. An intentional description of behavior can thus feature events of any size 
in its behavioral program. The result is the image given by Figure 1. The contents of both boxes can be 
described in the same terms. The fact that representational specifications, as neurally instantiated 
entities, are much smaller than the outward behavior for which they thought to form the program 
remains unaddressed and is even taken to be beside the point. 
 In this paper I will further ignore the intentional interpretation of behavior. Behavior will be 
interpreted as a complex spatio-temporal set of happenings. There will be made no reference to an agent 
who instigates and instructs the behavior. To mark this I will talk about organisms, both for its more 
neutral connotations and to stress the biological background of behavioral phenomena. This is not a 
reductive step. I ignore agenthood here. I do not deny it. At a suitably high level of organization the 
concept seems to apply very well (Bechtel, 1994; Keijzer & Bem, 1996). But the present enterprise is 
concerned with a different topic, namely the levels of organization which bring agent-related 
phenomena into being. To put it more down to earth; To understand how a car works, you will have to 
figure out how a collection of car-parts is assembled so that together they come to exhibit a totally new 
property: automotive power. You cannot deal with this problem by assuming that this `automotive 
power' somehow has to reside within the parts. I hold that the same goes for agency. 
 Without the intentional interpretation of the organism, the topic of relating processes at many 
different spatio-temporal scales comes to the fore immediately. The biological context of behavior 
provides ample evidence of the importance of spatio-temporal scale. Growing bigger is one of the major 
evolutionary trends and is closely associated with increased complexity (Bonner, 1988, 1993). Living 
organizations started out as complex, autocatalytic sets of biochemical processes (Maynard-Smith & 
Szatmáry, 1995), which gave rise to cellular life at least 3.5 billion years ago (Gould, 1994). The 
fundamental interactions between a living organization and its environment thus occur at the molecular 
and cellular scales. Only much later, about 530 years ago, the famous Cambrian explosion took place. In 
a mere 5 million years all but one modern phylum of animal life made their first appearance in the fossil 
record (ibid.). These multi-cellular organisms extended the range of organism-environment interactions 
to the much larger spatio-temporal scales with which we are familiar from everyday life—roughly the 
range between millimeters and kilometers. 
 The new scales of interaction opened up a whole new range of potential interactions (Breland & 
Breland, 1966; Maturana & Varela, 1988). A multicellular organization is not a simple magnification of 
an unicellular organism, which would look like an amorphous blob of living tissue. Instead, new, large-
scale structures are generated to exploit the possibilities of this new, large-scale level for the benefit of 
the cellular basis of life. The structure of plants is one example. Plants grow stalks which lift light-
catching leafs above potential obstructions and they grow roots which reach underground reservoirs of 
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water. Plant structure exploits the large-scale environmental characteristics in which light comes from 
above while water can be found underground). 
 Additionally, a living organization can come to interact with its environment at the scale of its 
multi-cellular body by self-initiated, reversible movement, without addition in tissue. Reversible 
movement offers a way to manipulate large-scaled environmental events, otherwise left to chance alone, 
in a way which is less costly and much faster than growth. Here, adaptive behavior has its origins. 
Compared to the plant strategy of building `permanent' structures, the ingenuity of even the most simple 
of behaviors is remarkable. When environmental circumstances become less agreeable, an organism 
does not have to stick it out or die. It can move away, or even change the disagreeable circumstances 
into something more congenial. By means of reversible movement, an organism can influence 
environmental happenings at scales far larger than its own body: Food is sought and found over wide 
areas and subsequently ingested, the body's integrity is maintained by avoiding harmful situations and so 
on. The capacity for behavior—which is the result of these reversible movements—is an extraordinary 
feat for what is initially a multi-cellular sack of goo. 
 Motor capacities and a nervous system play the key roles in extending the scale of interaction. 
Specialized cells capable of contracting make it possible for the multi-cellular organism to move as a 
whole. A nervous system made up from a network of cells which activate one another and the motor 
cells allows for the fast coordination of the capacity for self-initiated movement across the scale of the 
whole body. The capacity for coordinated motion at the bodily scale can, in turn, be modulated by 
specific sensory cues, and ultimately by very sophisticated sensory processes, which make possible the 
coordinated manipulation of the large-scale environment. Neural, bodily and large-scale environmental 
dynamics become linked to one another. Behavior, interpreted as a subpersonal process, thus involves a 
spatio-temporal structure extending over multiple scales of organization. Somehow, the large-scale 
dynamics have to be harnessed to benefit the small-scale dynamics of the living organization. A way to 
come to grips with these properties is by turning to the theory of self-organizing systems. 
 
2.2 Self-organization: Dynamical relations between scalar levels. 
The idea of multiple levels of organization implies that a distinction has to be made between happenings 
within one scalar level and relations between different scalar levels of organization. A simple metaphor 
can be enlightening here. The traditional image of basic happenings is that of simple elements, endlessly 
moving and colliding with one another. Once the position, direction and force of each element is exactly 
known, dynamical laws allow the exact prediction of all future and—because of the time symmetry 
here—past states of the system. The elements within such a system can be said to traverse an exactly 
specifiable `Newtonian trajectory' (Yates, 1993). The description of simple colliding elements can be 
applied to different levels of organization. Depending on the focus used, the described trajectory could 
be either that of a molecule in a gas or of a billiard-ball on a pool-table. This raises the question of how 
to describe the relation between the molecules—which make up the billiard-ball—and the billiard-ball 
as a whole. The Newtonian picture does not deal with the relations between different ontologies. 
Molecules do not collide with billiard-balls, they collide with other molecules, those which make up the 
billiard-ball. In principle, the Newtonian view treats the larger-scaled phenomenon in a reductive way. 
The billiard-ball is just a large collection of molecules. In practice, this view treats the separate 
dynamics independently from one another. In both cases, relations between differently-scaled dynamics 
are left out of the picture. 
 Accepting the multiple scales of natural organization as a fact, how should the dynamical 
relations between those scales be described? A standard answer here is that there are (almost) no such 
dynamical relations. Different scalar levels arise and can be treated as independent systems because the 
interactions with different levels are severely restricted (Simon, 1973; Salthe, 1985). If there were close 
dynamical interactions, the processes making up the different levels would not be dissociated from one 
another. With a change of scale the average rate with which processes take place changes as well. These 
rate differences restrict dynamical interactions between differently scaled events. For example, the 
dynamics within a single molecule are so fast compared to the dynamics of the billiard ball that the latter 
does not change at all within the molecular time frame. Given a focal scale S(n), dynamical changes at a 
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scale S(n+1) are so slow that, compared to processes happening at S(n), they do not change at all. 
Changes at S(n-1) on the other hand are so fast that they do not occur as individual events at S(n). 
Happenings at S(n-1) have to be averaged to describe their influence on S(n). As a result, both figure as 
(different) constants in the equations describing focal level dynamics (Salthe, 1985). The isolated 
dynamics cluster into separate levels which together make up a scalar hierarchy.  
 Nevertheless, while scalar levels may be independent of one another in general, there are many 
exceptions to this rule. In particular when living systems are concerned, processes happening at different 
scales can be closely connected. There is also a straightforward explanation for such coordinations 
between differently scaled dynamics. Given a clustering into separate levels as a consequence of rate 
differences, manipulating the rate changes at a specific scale would enable dynamical interactions 
between differently scaled dynamics. The different scales would no longer be independent under such 
circumstances. This type of speeding up and slowing down definitely occurs. The rate at which chemical 
reactions take place, for instance, is not only sensitive to the large scale boundary conditions 
(temperature) but also to the presence of catalysts which operate within the same scalar level. The rate of 
change is thus variable at a specific scale, and different scales can dynamically interact. 
 The study of self-organizing systems addresses the relations between differently-scaled, so-
called microscopic and macroscopic, events. As pointed out above, in the original Newtonian view on 
dynamics there were no different levels. The development of thermodynamics in the nineteenth century 
changed the picture in so far that it now made sense to talk about the collective properties of many parts 
in terms of simple, large scaled variables like heat and pressure. However, the second law of 
thermodynamics, then formulated, states that natural systems tend towards a state of thermal equilibrium 
where disorder is maximal. There did not seem to be many possibilities for the generation of large scale 
order as a collective property of many interacting parts. Only fairly recently has it been established that 
under specific circumstances—in systems pumped with energy and thus far from thermal equilibrium—
large scale order does result from the interactions of small scaled parts (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; 
Gleick, 1987; Haken, 1987). One of the impressive early examples which helped to bring this message 
home consists of a chemical reaction discovered by Belousov and Zhabotinskii in the fifties. Some 
chemicals diffusing in a solution in a shallow glass dish produce concentric circles and spiral waves 
across the solution's surface (Goodwin, 1994). Since then, the occurrence of large-scale, or macroscopic, 
patterns from small-scale, or microscopic, interactions have become a widely established phenomenon. 
 I will introduce two concepts which have been developed in the study of self-organizing 
systems—the order parameter and the control parameter (Haken, 1987)—by looking at a system of 
coupled oscillators (Strogatz & Stewart, 1993; Matthews & Strogatz, 1990; Stewart & Golubitsky, 
1992). An oscillator is any system which executes periodic behavior, for example a clock, a flashing 
firefly, a neural rhythm or a dripping faucet. When an oscillator has a stable—that is perturbation 
resistent—frequency and amplitude it is called a limit-cycle oscillator. A limit-cycle oscillator has a 
dissipative mechanism to damp oscillations that grow too large and a source of energy to pump up those 
that become too small. The paradigmatic example is the pendulum clock. Such clocks also illustrate the 
coupling or entrainment of oscillators. Christiaan Huygens discovered in 1665 that two pendulum clocks 
hanging on a common support tend to synchronize (Strogatz & Stewart, 1993). When hung more widely 
apart, the clocks loose this perfect synchrony. This mutual influence of two separate oscillators is called 
coupling. In this case only two oscillators were present, but it is also possible to have a large group of 
coupled oscillators, such as a swarm of fireflies or a collection of neural elements which show individual 
oscillatory activity. In a large system of coupled oscillators interesting things can happen. Because of the 
mutual influence of the individual oscillators, global synchronization can occur at a much larger 
temporal scale than the cycles of the individual oscillators. The system as a whole can show large scale 
order, even when the individual oscillators diverge in their amplitude and their individual frequency. 
The large-scale order of the system can then be described by a simple order parameter or collective 
variable (Haken, 1987; Kelso, 1995).  
 Haken first developed his order parameter concept when working on the laser. This concept is 
based on a so-called linear stability analysis: An initial random starting pattern can be described as the 
superposition of many different vibratory modes. A system of coupled oscillators slightly out of phase 
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and frequency would be an example. Given random initial conditions, some, or even most, of these 
different modes will be damped out. At the same time, others will expand across the system. The mode 
or pattern with the biggest rate of increase will eventually dominate the total system. The order 
parameter describes the resulting, large-scale coherent pattern which exhibits its own large-scale 
characteristics. Haken describes the mutual influence between the macroscopic order parameter and the 
microscopic oscillations as circular causality (Kelso, 1995; Haken, 1995). The large-scale order 
parameter acts as an independent entity which constrains—Haken says enslaves—the activity of the 
small-scale individual oscillators. At the same time, the small-scale individual oscillators together 
generate a large-scale order parameter. The influence is mutual, neither is primary to the other one. 
 The second important concept is that of a control parameter. This is usually an experimentally 
manipulatable parameter to which the collective behavior of the system is sensitive. When a control 
parameter is changed, the system of coupled oscillators may start to exhibit different order parameters. 
In this case, the system undergoes a so-called phase shift. So far, for reasons of mathematical 
tractability, primarily systems in which each oscillator is coupled equally to each of the others have been 
investigated (Matthews & Strogatz, 1990). Under these circumstances, changing the coupling strength 
by which each oscillator influences the other ones or the spread of the individual oscillator frequencies 
results in typical macroscopic behaviors, for example locking, incoherence and amplitude death (ibid.). 
In these cases, the density of interaction can thus be used as a control parameter to modulate large-scale 
phase shifts of the macroscopic order parameter.  
 The word `control parameter' is a bit unfortunate, as it invokes associations with control theory 
and a controller. However, the control parameter does not `control' the system in any conventional 
sense. The order comes from the system itself. The control parameter does not prescribe what the system 
should do. This parameter is an externally modifiable variable that pushes the system into different 
forms of self-organized order. It is a mere non-specific trigger with respect to the changed dynamics of 
the self-organizing system. The non-specific control parameter concept is a very powerful challenge to 
the accepted machine and computer metaphors of biological order (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.62), and 
will play a prominent role when discussing anticipatory behavior. 
 
 
2.3 Coordinations between neural, bodily and environmental dynamics. 
The self-organization of systems of coupled oscillators offers a new way to understand the operation of 
a nervous system (Alexander & Globus, 1996; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; see also Kortmulder & 
Feuth-de Bruijn, 1993). In behavioral explanations based on representational specification the activity of 
neurons is interpreted as an input-output device which receives and sends information. However, 
neurons can also easily be interpreted as oscillatory units (Alexander & Globus, 1996). Given this 
interpretation, the total nervous system forms a larger oscillatory network, the behavior of which 
depends on the characteristics of its components and their connections. As the nervous system is an 
organ that extends itself over the scale of the total body of an organism, and because the connections 
between neurons allow very swift interactions across this network, it forms a means for dynamical 
patterns to organize themselves very fast (starting at tens of milliseconds) at the bodily scale. In turn, the 
neural dynamics is tied to a musculo-skeletal system capable of initiating environmental changes at the 
bodily scale. The bodily dynamics in turn influences dynamical relations within the environment.  
 This multiply-scaled conceptualization of adaptive behavior is a good way to describe the 
behavioral systems approach to behavior. The most famous early example of this approach consists 
probably of Rodney Brooks' behavior based robots (Brooks, 1989). A local operating control structure 
helps to organize the dynamics of a robot's moving parts. The robot so becomes capable of standing up, 
moving forward and achieve a number of other tasks in the environment. Work done by Taga on bipedal 
locomotion provides an example which is explicitly formulated as the coordination of several 
differently-scaled dynamics (Taga, 1994; Taga, Yamaguchi & Shimizu, 1991). The model consists of a 
rhythm generating neural network, a musculo-skeletal system and an environment (Figure 2a). These act 
in parallel as three dynamical systems which mutually entrain one another and therefore become and 
remain coordinated. The total result is bipedal locomotion which remains stable when perturbed. The 
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neural rhythm generator generates spatio-temporal patterns of activity without any external input. These 
patterns provide the motor signals which set the musculo-skeletal system into motion. The latter consists 
of two legs, each composed of a  hip-, knee- and ankle joint and a thigh and shank (Figure 2b). The legs 
are connected together at the hip joint. The musculo-skeletal system moves according to its own 
dynamics, given the constraints of the environment and the motor signals. It can be thought of as a 
swing which has its own momentum while it is kept in motion by someone who pushes it at the right 
moments. Sensory signals which indicate the current state of the musculo-skeletal system and the 
environment are sent to the neural rhythm generator. These signals in turn entrain the centrally generated 
neural rhythm and allow it to adapt to the limbs' actual rhythm. The total neuro-musculo-skeletal system 
is situated on a stable limit cycle in the system's state space. Unpredictable environmental influences on 
the system, for instance changes in the profile of the ground which disturb the limbs' rhythm, are 
neutralized by the orbital stability of the limit cycle. Changes in the gait patterns are produced by 
bifurcations of the limit cycle. The whole system in turn is influenced by a central control parameter 
which changes the level of activity of the neural rhythm generator. Changes in this parameter induce 
changes in speed as well as changes in the gait between walking and running. 
 
   === insert Figure 2 about here === 
 
 Similar models of the mutually flexible entraining between neural rhythm generators and the 
rhythm of the musculo-skeletal are also employed in neuroethology. Camhi, for example, describes how 
locust flight involves the coaction of oscillators at two different scales. A neural oscillator tends to 
impose a steady rhythm on the wings, while the wing's actual oscillations are used to modulate the 
neural oscillator so that the locust can react flexibly to differing environmental circumstances (Camhi, 
1984, p.353). A similar interaction between neural and bodily oscillations has been established for leech 
swimming (Cohen, Rossignol & Grillner, 1988).  
 A scalar interpretation in which several dynamical levels of organization are coupled and 
generate the spatio-temporal patterns of behavior in a self-organizing process agrees very well with 
actual models of adaptive behavior in artificial and real agents. The behavior which such models can 
generate remains limited, however: It consists of short-term repeatable behavior which is well adapted to 
the local, so-called proximal, environment. Adaptive longer-term behavioral sequences are not 
accounted for.  
 It is self-evident that, given time, the continuous locomotion generated by a model such as that 
of Taga will allow a behaving system to travel large distances. However, for biological organisms long-
distance movement is usually oriented towards specific places, objects or events which have to be 
reached or achieved. Such a large scale, or distal orientation of behavior is often maintained despite 
many intervening environmental disturbances. Taga's model, for example, has no such capacity. It can 
only counteract environmental disturbances on the walking movement itself. A mere walking 
mechanism will only walk forward, and not towards a goal. If someone pointed it in the right direction 
at the beginning, any disturbance would throw it off course. 
 The obvious solution is to use sensory signals to steer the behavior. This would allow a 
behaving system to orient itself with respect to its environment at a relatively large scale and to maintain 
a stable distal course. For example, a behaving system might steer towards a directed source of sensory 
stimulation by maintaining an even input at two frontally placed sensors (Loeb, 1918; Braitenberg, 
1984). In this way the distal goal can be reached despite disturbances. This solution remains very 
limited, however, as it depends on unambiguous local signals which reliably specify distal 
circumstances (Campbell, 1966; Fodor, 1986). For many behaviors there are no such local stimuli. For 
example, the lion goes in search of a prey, it does not wait till it sees, smells or hears one. Proximal 
guidance will never be the full story. 
 Here we enter the next stage in the discussion on representation. Those in favor of a 
representation-based explanation of behavior hold that, for an organism to exhibit behavior which is 
oriented towards the non-local environment, it will be necessary for the organism to have an internal 
representational model to act as the relevant guiding factor (Clark, 1997; Clark & Toribio, 1994; 
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Jeannerod, 1997; Rosen, 1987). I do agree that pure interactionism faces severe problems here. On the 
other hand, I do also think that the problems connected to representation-based accounts are even worse 
(Keijzer, 1997). While acknowledging the problems faced by interactionism, one should still try to 
extend the interactionist approach so that it does become capable of coping with anticipatory behavior. 
This is what I will do in the next section. 
 
 
3. Applying a morphogenetic conceptual framework to anticipatory behavior. 
Adaptive behavior has been interpreted as a macroscopic structure that emerges from the self-organizing 
interplay between micro- and macroscopic processes. To deal with specific anticipatory behavior it will 
be necessary to extend our thinking in terms of micro-macro interactions. An interactionist conceptual 
framework is required which is able to deal with distal goal-orientedness. More specifically, the 
conceptual framework should explain how specific long-term spatio-temporal structure arises (distally 
oriented behavior) of which the short-term constituents can be interpreted as arising `in order to' achieve 
the distal goal.  
 The new territory for thinking in terms of micro-macro interactions consists of the multiple 
scales of behavior itself. The relations between smaller- (e.g. movements) and larger-scaled behavior 




3.1 Similarities between morphogenesis and behavior. 
The first step towards an extended interactionist conceptual framework consists of drawing an analogy 
between anticipatory behavior and morphogenesis. Morphogenesis is the process by which a single 
germ cell grows into a highly complex and differentiated multicellular organization. How this comes 
about has been a long-standing problem in biology and forms the topic of embryology or, to mention the 
more modern expression, developmental biology. How, for example, after a number of cell-divisions, 
does a cell `know' that it has to turn into epidermis while its neighbor becomes part of the nervous 
system? Important constitutive principles at a microscopic scale, like cell movements, cell death and cell 
differentiation (Edelman, 1988), all happen in real time in order to generate a particular multicellular 
structure on a larger time scale. The process of morphogenesis leads consistently and (particularly for 
big and complex organisms) in non-stereotypical ways to a highly specific goal state: a multicellular 
body with the right parts in the right place. As in the case of behavior, disturbances of the normal course 
of events can be counteracted up to a point. If they are not, specific deformations occur. 
 There are several reasons why someone interested in behavior might take a closer look at 
morphogenesis. For one, the structure of a nervous system is itself a result of morphogenetic processes. 
These processes are thus directly relevant for the construction of one of the most important factors in 
behavioral organization. Foremost, however, I want to stress the conceptual similarity of morphogenesis 
and behavior which was, for example, already noted by Lashley (1951; see also Kelso, 1995). Both 
processes can be described as goal oriented, regularly resulting in a well-formed adult body and an 
achieved act respectively. In both cases, this anticipatory character tends to be explained by 
representational specifications, localized either in the genes or in the brain (Pattee, 1977, 1987). 
 An important difference between morphogenesis and behavior consists of the detailed 
knowledge of the processes involved in morphogenesis. In the case of morphogenesis, both the material 
substrates of the microscopic `symbolical description' and the macroscopic form are known. Genes, 
encoded in DNA, provide a concrete embodiment of the `symbolical description', while it is not 
established which feature of a nervous system would be its behavioral equivalent. The same goes for the 
large-scale, behavioral equivalent of bodily form. Behavior is in large part a temporal structure, 
consisting of patterns in time (Eibl-Eibesfeld, 1970). It is not naturally fixated in matter, such as body 
tissues. Behavior's fleeting structure requires recording techniques such as video or abstract notations to 
fixate the temporal pattern in a spatial form that can be studied at leisure (Berridge, 1990; Fentress, 
1994; Jacobs, et al. 1988). The systematic and particularly the detailed study of behavioral form has 
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consequently had a late start compared to the study of bodily form. Even now there is no generally 
accepted way of encoding behavioral structure and a lot of work is still based on highly intuitive notions 
(Jacobs, et al. 1988). Embryology is thus a field which addresses a problem very similar to behavior, but 
with much more background knowledge of the concrete details involved. Its way of conceptualizing and 
modeling the relation between `symbolical descriptions' and macroscopic form is highly corroborated by 
a relatively detailed knowledge of the actual processes happening in between. An account of behavior 
could benefit greatly from the ideas and models developed here.  
 Both morphogenesis and behavior have given rise to the idea of representational specifications. 
How this is thought to work for behavior has been discussed above, but the case of morphogenesis 
deserves attention here. The idea that a genetic program specifies body form implies a separation of the 
genetic information and the process by which this information is turned into a multicellular organism. 
This separation is reflected in the distinction between the biological fields of genetics and embryology. 
Embryology is mainly concerned with the developmental process within the individual. The 
embryologist's question is "How does a germ cell develop into a multicellular organism?" In the 
nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century, the study of morphogenesis turned from 
a mainly descriptive into a real experimental science. Many details of the developmental process, as well 
as ways to manipulate it experimentally, were discovered, for instance by grafting cells taken from one 
place on another part of the embryo, adding chemicals and so on (Gilbert, 1991; Gottlieb, 1992). The 
embryologist's focus was thus on the intricacies of the developmental processes which happen within the 
cellular cytoplasm and on the interactions between cells. 
 However, starting in the 1920s, embryology as a front line science was largely overtaken by 
developments within the new and vigorous field of genetics. In the 1930s, Mendelian genetics and 
Darwin's model of variation and selection were welded together to form the `modern synthesis' or `neo-
darwinism' (Depew & Weber, 1995; Gottlieb, 1992). The modern synthesis brought biology what it did 
not have before—a coherent theoretical basis: Life on earth was the result of genetic variation and 
consequent selection. In contrast to embryology's interest in the cytoplasmic processes leading up to a 
grown individual organism, the new view stressed the importance of the genetic program to a very high 
degree. Interest became much more explicitly and exclusively focussed on the contingency of 
evolutionary processes, in contrast to the search for general principles underlying individual 
development (Resnik, 1994; Gottlieb, 1992). Genes were the entities that could vary and were 
transmitted from one generation to the next. These where the entities that mattered for evolution theory 
and it was thought that gene action alone could explain everything that a biologist might be interested in. 
The embryological questions became viewed as less relevant than questions relating to shifts in gene 
frequencies: "the great bulk ... of the protoplasm [is], after all, only a by-product of the action of the 
gene material" (Muller, 1926, quoted in Keller, 1995, p.8). American geneticists in the twenties started 
to talk about gene action as if it was self-evident what that meant. The embryologist's question "How 
does a germ cell develop into a multicellular organism?" was replaced by another: "How do genes 
produce their effects?" What happened in between was not conceived of as an interesting topic in its 
own right but was seen as a "chain of reactions" leading from the gene to the gene's effect.  
 This was the context in which genes could be interpreted as the `brain' of a cell (Keller, 1995). 
The cell's nucleus (and in particular its DNA) became the initiator of intelligent action which instructed 
the cell's cytoplasm to do what was necessary to achieve the cell's goals. As far as the genesis of 
multicellular structure is concerned, these ideas led to a conceptual schema in which genes are the 
symbolical encodings of large scale traits, to which they are connected by a causal chain. This can be 
envisioned in the same way as the relation between representational specifications and the resulting 
behavior (see Figure 1). The conceptual overlap between anticipatory behavior and morphogenesis 
should be clear by now. But what relevance does it have for an interactionist account of behavior? So 
far, morphogenesis is just another explanation in terms of representational specifications. 
 
3.2 Genes do not specify traits, they act in mutual interaction with the cytoplasm. 
The geneticists ignored the cytoplasmic complexities of morphogenesis and searched instead for simple 
relations between genes and traits. This approach turned out to be extremely productive. In 1940 Beadle 
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and Tatum proposed an explanation of how genes produce their effects in a form that came to be known 
as the `one gene-one enzyme' hypothesis (Keller, 1995, p.17). The most important success was, of 
course, Crick and Watson's discovery of the structure of DNA as the molecular basis of genes in 1953. 
The long and variable sequences of base pairs making up the DNA molecules gave material evidence of 
entities which were previously theoretical. DNA sequences explained how the reproduction of genetic 
traits takes place across generations. They also offered a `code-book' for prescribing the composition of 
proteins which could act as enzymes. Gene action could now be understood as DNA coding for specific 
enzymes. These basic insights led to the subsequent rise of molecular biology and an explosion of 
insight into the details of molecular interactions within and between cells. 
 Ironically, as a result of the increasingly detailed knowledge of the molecular operation of 
genes, somehow the experimental frame of reference changed. It became more and more clear that 
genes were not the sole, or even the major, locus of control. They did not, in a uni-directional way, 
instigate protein building and subsequently  macroscopic structure. Instead, the genetic code is part of an 
intricate, parallel and reciprocal interaction with cytoplasmic processes, which are at least as much in 
control as the genetic material (Nijhout, 1990). Talk about `gene action' was replaced by `gene 
activation' (Keller, 1995, p.26). DNA is not directly transcribed into proteins, but first into nuclear RNA 
(in multicellular organisms at least), then into messenger RNA, and only then into proteins. All these 
steps are modulated by cytoplasmic processes and can even lead to one gene coding for more than one 
protein (Kauffman, 1993, p.416). Another thing that has become clear is that many genes do not code 
for proteins at all. These genes are not `structural genes' but `regulatory' ones. Regulatory genes 
influence the transcription of structural genes in direct or indirect ways. For example, promoters are 
DNA sites situated near a structural gene. When the promotor is bound by (reacts with) a specific 
molecular `key' transcription takes place. Unless, of course, an operator site, situated between the 
promoter and the structural site, blocks transcription. This happens when the operator is bound by the 
presence of its own molecular key. In turn, the operator's block can be removed again by the presence of 
yet another molecular key. Kauffman calls this organization a "genetic regulatory network" (Kauffman, 
1993, p.417). This is not a static array but a dynamical organization "made up of all the complex 
feedback webs and cycles of control acting at all these levels" (ibid.). Again, this network is not only 
genetic. Cytoplasmic factors are important in initiating and maintaining proper regulation. The mutually 
influencing genetic, cytoplasmic and larger-scaled factors make up a very complex regulative network, 
in which no single entity forms the locus of control. This is a large step away from the initial thought 
that genes direct the cytoplasm and so determine bodily form. 
 The drift away from the idea of any direct gene action becomes even greater when considering 
the relation between genes which do code for proteins and larger scaled processes, such as cell 
differentiation and tissue formation. Gene products change the direction in which specific cells or tissues 
develop, but not by directly specifying the proper end result. Instead, the embryological frame of 
reference has again come to the fore: Gene products tend to direct the developing organism into specific 
epigenetic pathways. An epigenetic pathway (Waddington, 1975) can be visualized as floating 
downstream into a river delta. An undifferentiated germ cell starts at the undivided point and 
subsequently choices have to be made between successive right and left turns. The consecutive choices 
decide which branch of the river—or, correspondingly, which multicellular structure—is reached. Gene 
products can initiate choices, whether to go `right' or `left', at particular turns within this epigenetic 
landscape. On the other hand, genes do not direct the layout of the  epigenetic landscape. Their activity 
depends on and is limited by the features of the landscape which it confronts. The landscape itself is a 
cumulative result of all the variables which influence morphogenesis on all relevant scales. The 
developing embryo is an unstable dynamical system which has many time- and space-dependent 
dispositions for further development. Gene products can trigger such propensities, but so can many other 
non-specific `signals' in an experimental setup when the system is situated at a branching point.  
 A concrete example will make more clear what genes do and what they do not do. Take the 
process of neurulation, the beginning of the formation of the nervous system in vertebrates. After a 
previous developmental stage called gastrulation, the embryo consists of three basic germ layers; the 
most inward is called the endoderm, the middle is the mesoderm, and the most outward is the ectoderm. 
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The endoderm is destined to become the gut and related structures. The mesoderm turns into skeleton, 
connective tissues and muscles. The ectoderm becomes epidermis and the nervous system. At some 
point in development, the ectoderm must thus differentiate into the nervous system on the one hand, and 
epidermis on the other. This happens when on the dorsal side—the embryo's `back'—the part of the 
ectoderm layer which will become nervous system folds inward to form an elongated groove. This 
inward folding of ectodermal cells continues until a separated, closed neural tube is formed. This tube is 
situated underneath the remaining ectoderm which closes above it and develops further into epidermis 
(Gilbert, 1994). The neural tube differentiates further to form the nervous system. The process of 
neurulation is triggered by chemical "inducing factors" originating in the underlying mesoderm. The 
exact relation of these inducing factors to the genetic regulatory network is unclear in vertebrates (which 
show neurulation). "Knowledge of the cellular mechanisms of pattern formation is more extensive in 
studies of vertebrate species, whereas knowledge of the genetic control of pattern is most developed in 
studies of invertebrates." (Edelman, 1988, p.26; see also Slack, 1991). It is, however, plausible that a 
genetic regulatory network comparable to that of invertebrates instigates the release of the proper 
inducing factor. What is surprising here is that the inducing factor is very unspecific, no more than a 
trigger which initiates the process of neurulation. Once set in motion, the rather complex set of 
happenings runs its own course. This was already discovered in the 1930s when it was shown that 
ectoderm could be turned into neural tissue by introducing many different and nonspecific factors into a 
cell culture, such as alcohol and even distilled water (Holtfreter, 1991, p.121). Thus "it became clear that 
the ectoderm was delicately balanced between epidermal and neural pathways and that a variety of 
stimuli could tip the balance one way or the other." (Slack, 1991, p.106). The increased insight into 
molecular biology allows the revindication of these old findings in the context of genetic functioning. 
 Kauffman summarizes the case as follows: "Morphogenesis is not just the genome's `doing'; 
rather, it is the consequence in time and space of the structural and catalytic properties of proteins 
encoded in time and space by the genome, acting in concert with nonprotein materials and with physical 
and chemical forces to yield reliable forms." (1993, p.410). Genes do not instruct the cytoplasm, they 
rely on the intrinsic disposition of cytoplasmic processes to generate spatial and temporal structure. As 
Gottlieb puts it, genes are a part of a complex but highly coordinated system of regulatory dynamics that 
operate simultaneously at multiple scales, extending from genes to chromosomes, to the cell's nucleus, 
cytoplasm, tissues and up to the whole organism (Gottlieb, 1992, p.142).  
 
 
3.3 A dynamical interpretation: Genes act as internal control parameters. 
Molecular biology is primarily concerned with unravelling the specific details of the molecular 
interactions within living organisms. A more theoretical approach is now proposed by e.g. Stuart 
Kauffman (1993) and Brian Goodwin (1994; Goodwin, Kauffman & Murray, 1993; Boyd & Noble, 
1993). Kauffman and Goodwin try to give a more general, and a more abstracted, understanding of the 
minute molecular interactions. They search for general principles characterizing these interactions. They 
stress the self-organizing properties of the living organization. Many small-scale interactions in the 
living organization give rise to order at a larger scale and these, in turn, on still larger scales. The topic 
of self-organization has already been discussed above. The new thing here is the implication of the 
genome.2 When genes are no longer to be seen as specifying what the cell has to do, then what do genes 
do? Goodwin and Kauffman argue that the order exhibited by living organisms is largely the result of 
inherent, dynamical ordering principles which are a general feature of all of nature. In this respect they 
hark back to the rational morphologists of the nineteenth century who sought general organizing 
principles in living nature and eschewed the selectionist ideas of Darwin because these would make 
living systems a hodgepodge of independent traits which could either be present or not (Resnik, 1994).  
 The general picture sketched by people like Kauffman and Goodwin is as follows. Self-
organizing systems produce macroscopic order. This order is not the result from genetic instructions, but 
results from the intrinsic dispositions of dynamical, non-equilibrium systems. Such systems conform to 
a macroscopic order parameter when certain boundary conditions are met. This order is highly specific 
and arises predictably when, and as long as, the proper control parameters are present. When the control 
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parameters change, a different order parameter can occur or order can disappear. Ordinarily, the 
presence of control parameters is a matter of chance. Either there is a heat gradient or an enzyme 
present, or not. However, if things are not left to chance, then the manipulation of control parameters 
offers a means to influence the order parameter in predictable ways. If a self-organizing system were to 
be exposed to specific sets, sequences and distributions of control parameters, this could lead to a highly 
specific and intricate macroscopic structure which would never occur when left to chance (Pattee, 1987). 
The whole process would be even more geared to generate specific macroscopic order when the control 
parameters could be turned on and off by the same self-organizing process in an appropriate way. 
Kauffman's genetic regulatory network offers a way in which this switching could take place. 
 It is easy to see how the gene-cytoplasm relations could be interpreted as such a self-
modulating, self-organizing system. The cytoplasm exhibits self-organizing properties which, under the 
influence of specific gene products, could be guided over longer time scales to develop an appropriate 
multicellular structure (Goodwin, 1994, p.97; see also Kelso, 1995, p.140). Genes can then be 
interpreted as control parameters which are internal to the system, Internal Control Parameters (ICP) 
for short (Meijer & Bongaardt, 1996). This interpretation offers a more general, theoretical 
understanding of the role played by genes in the self-organizing cytoplasmic processes resulting in the 
formation of specific macroscopic structures. Of course, it is an idealization which glosses over all the 
actual molecular, cellular and intercellular intricacies involved (Slack, 1991; Edelman, 1988). On the 
other hand, it is just the sort of idealization which is needed: It gives a general conceptual framework 
which allows a global understanding of the production of an extended and highly specific macroscopic 
order by a microscopic organization. It provides a conceptual alternative to the similarly general idea of 
the genetic specification of extended macroscopic order. I will apply the new conceptual framework in 
order to make sense of anticipatory behavior, without representational specification. 
 Before turning to behavior it will be useful to introduce some terminology to accompany the 
interpretation given here to gene-trait relations. It has been argued that genes do not specify macroscopic 
order. This order is inherent in the self-organizing system. Nevertheless, when genes act as control 
parameters, there will be a connection between genes and traits on a large scale. There should be, of 
course, as there is ample empirical evidence relating specific genes to specific macroscopic traits. 
Consequently, when a coarse enough focus is maintained, genes can still be said to specify traits (Thelen 
& Smith, 1994). There are two problems with this loose usage of `specification'. The first problem is 
that it is very unclear. Whether or not a gene specifies a trait depends on the scalar focus used and can 
thus be considered to be both true and false, depending on the scale of observation used. Natural 
language does not usually keep track of the scale at which a statement applies, and talking about 
`specification' does not do much to remedy this. The second problem has to do with the implied 
directness and directedness of the word `specify'. It neglects the intervening, self-organizing processes 
and the mutual influencing which goes in both directions. It highlights only the genetic code and the 
encoded trait and puts them in an unidirectional relation: the code specifies the trait.  
 In contrast, when genes are interpreted as ICP's, the very existence of the large-scale relations 
depends on the always slightly divergent and non-repeatable happenings in between code and trait. Two 
technical terms will be introduced to stress this point. Genes will be said to be `appropriate' or not, 
referring to their relevance for generating happenings at larger scales. Macroscopic traits are `sufficient' 
or not, depending whether they suffice to fulfil the requirements posed by the microscopic living 
organization. Both terms relate to the intermediate scale relations and stress the historical, contingent 
nature of the relations between microscopy and macroscopy. It can be acknowledged that genes are 
appropriate, while, at the same time, rejecting their interpretation as a specific symbolical code, a 
description, or a blueprint of macroscopic form (Pattee, 1977, 1987). If genes are a set of stored ICP's, 
this symbolic interpretation does not apply. Genes do not encode macroscopic form. Rather, they help 
produce it in conjunction with cytoplasmic and inter-cellular processes.  
 Genes are importantly related to macroscopic structure because they modulate and are 
modulated by the living organization which ultimately comes to exhibit a macroscopic structure, or not. 
Genes are appropriate when their presence is a condition for the occurrence of macroscopic form. But 
this only applies within the context of the living organization in which they take part. There is no 
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meaning or symbolism intrinsic to genes outside of this context. Within this context they are only 
entities with the propensity to help attain macroscopic orderings which are suitable to maintain the 
living system's integrity. The relation between genes and macroscopic traits derives from the mediating 
process, and is basically an arbitrary connection. 
 Sufficiency replaces the other side of the seeming specificity of large-scale gene-trait relations. 
There is of course a degree of specificity present. For instance, for a leopard it is important for it to have 
four legs, one tail, one head and so on. The point here, however, is that next to such general specificity 
there is a lot of room for individual variation. In that sense, the large-scale structure does not have to be 
a specific one at all. It only has to fulfil certain standards of sufficiency. To return to the leopard, it tends 
to have spots, but how these are distributed across its pelt varies. Thus, while `specificity' is 
conceptually connected to a precise and exact macroscopic structure, `sufficiency' focusses our attention 
on the variability and contingency of the macroscopy. The underlying microscopic processes do not 
have to converge on one specific point, but on anything which falls within a much wider area of 
acceptable macroscopic structures. 
 
 
3.4 Can anticipatory behavior be guided by internal control parameters? 
Genetic functioning is no longer interpreted in terms of a simple specification model. The latter only 
applies within a coarse grained analysis of gene-trait relations. It is now time to turn around the analogy 
in which genes are envisioned as the "brain of a cell", and the image of an `intelligent and 
knowledgeable brain' is used as a way to understand gene action. I will use the modern interpretation of 
genetic activation to make sense of the relation between the nervous system and anticipatory behavior.  
 The big picture of the morphogenetic conceptual framework consists of a cellular microscopy 
which succeeds in generating a sufficient order at increasingly large spatio-temporal scales. The 
following features appear to be crucial for this phenomenon: (a) There is self-organizing, dynamical 
organization in which circular relations between macroscopic boundary conditions at S(n) and 
microscopic dynamics at S(n-1) produce macroscopic orderings at S(n). (b) The microscopy contains 
selected variables which—in specific time windows and under appropriate boundary conditions—can 
act as internal control parameters. (c) The internal control parameters are part of a regulatory network at 
S(n-1) which modulates the timing of their activation. (d) Under the influence of the modulated timing 
of the internal control parameters an epigenetic pathway is traversed which results in an ordering at the 
larger scale of S(n+1)). (e) Success or failure of generating order at S(n+1) must eventually feed back to 
the regulatory network at S(n-1) (e.g. by selection or learning). 
 To apply the morphogenetic conceptual framework to behavior, these features will have to be 
present in the behavioral context. The task at hand is to argue that this is a plausible assumption. This 
task is both simple and complex. It is simple because these features often almost self-evidently apply to 
neural and behavioral phenomena. There are many obvious correspondences. What makes it complex is 
to establish how deep such correspondences run. Offering detailed accounts of the neural, musculo-
skeletal and environmental equivalents of these features would be a huge enterprise, one which would 
occupy the agenda of complete research institutions for extended periods. However, the immediate goal 
is limited to establishing that the morphogenetic framework is at least consistent with the behavioral 
facts. So, what I will do is point out the most conspicuous correspondences and hint at some of the 
details which could actually implement the morphogenetic conceptual framework.  
 In Section 2, behavior was conceptualized as the mutual coupling between the differently-scaled 
dynamics of the neural system, the musculo-skeletal system and the environment. This dynamical 
organization provides an obvious candidate to play the role of feature (a). The initial condition for 
applying the morphogenetic conceptual framework to behavior is thus fulfilled. In accordance with 
feature (d), it was also argued in Section 2 that regular, behavioral trajectories emerge at a larger spatio-
temporal scale than more basic organism-environment couplings. After all, this correspondence drew 
out the conceptual link with morphogenesis in the first place. The remaining features are more specific 
and arguing for their presence is more speculative. Nevertheless, it is clearly possible that the neural 
system, the musculo-skeletal system and the environment have the required features. 
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 First, it is very probable that the nervous system is capable of providing internal control 
parameters for behavior (b). Maybe the most convincing argument in favor of this possibility is the sheer 
complexity of the nervous system. Anything could happen there. Providing ICP's should not be a 
problem. Several general features point in this direction. The brain shows many mappings in which 
environmental features map onto specific neural structures. These could play a role in the longer-term 
guidance of behavior. It is also self-evident that the nervous system operates on multiple time-scales. 
Humans exhibit fast reflexes as well as slow, reflective actions. Berridge (1990) compared the grooming 
behavior of several rodent species and found that the large scale structure of grooming was more stable 
across species than were the component actions. Fentress (1991, 1994) mentions research on rats in 
which striatal lesions had minimal effects upon movement form but disrupted the integrity of behavioral 
sequences and made the animals hypersensitive to environmental disturbances. All this points to a 
dissociation of the neural involvement in behavioral organization at different time-scales. Can these 
generally supportive properties be interpreted in a way which is coherent with a morphogenetic 
conceptual framework? Work which is now being done on reinterpreting neural functioning in terms of 
coupled oscillators is an approach which is congenial to the one advocated here (Alexander & Globus, 
1996). A specific argument for the existence of behavioral ICP's comes from Scott Kelso (1995). Kelso's 
famous `finger-experiments' demonstrated that simple finger-movements exhibit properties indicative of 
dynamical self-organization. These self-organizing movement properties are under the influence of non-
specific control parameters such as the frequency of the movement. However, when dealing with issues 
of learning and intentionality, Kelso states: "I argue that it is necessary to incorporate another kind of 
forcing, namely, that of specific parametric influences. ... instead of frequency moving the fingers 
through different phasing patterns, the fingers are instead required to produce a specific phasing pattern." 
(Kelso, 1995, p.138). Kelso argues that a dynamical self-organizing behavioral process can be guided in 
specific directions by appropriate control parameters, originating within the brain (ibid., p.140). This fits 
the bill good enough.3  
 Another requirement is that behavioral ICP's are part of a regulatory network which modulates 
the timing of their activation. Well, the nervous system is more or less the prototype for thinking in 
terms of regulatory networks. While in morphogenesis the network is the abstract part of the system—a 
set of modulatory influences between different processes—and the produced form the tangible end-
result, in the case of the neural system matters are reversed. The nervous system is physically a network. 
In addition, in case of the human nervous system most of the network is not directly connected to 
sensory or motor surfaces. Maturana and Varela (1988) mention a ratio of 10:100,000:1 for respectively 
sensory-, inter-, and motor neurons, A very large part of the nervous system thus seems to have some 
regulatory function. Bickhard and Terveen (1995, p.310-314) discuss recent work in neuroscience 
centering around modulatory processes of endogenous oscillatory activity. This research stresses the 
variation in volume and temporal modulatory relationships which permeates the whole brain. "The 
larger volume effects are clearly also longer time scale modulations. In the brain, such slower and larger 
volume modulations can constitute modulations of the already ongoing modulations among neural 
oscillations and within neural networks" (ibid., p.312). There are clear empirical possibilities for the 
requisite regulatory network. 
 Finally, the consequences of large-scale, behavioral order will have to feed back to the 
regulatory network at the scale of the neural modulations (e). In other words, learning has to take place. 
This looks relatively simple—learning definitely occurs—but when considering plausible mechanisms 
which could accomplish appropriate feedback relations, things become remarkably complex. General 
ideas about how the neural system can change appropriately so that large-scale order arises, have been 
provided by e.g. Edelman (1987) and Purves (1988). To make successful feedback possible, specific 
structures at the neural scale are necessary. For instance, learning by reinforcement requires a value 
system within the neural system to distinguish appropriate and inappropriate actions (Friston et al., 
1994). Specific neural pathways which signal positive and negative outcomes of behavior (pain and 
pleasure) could provide this value. However, for anticipatory behavior, the feedback should apply to 
large spatio-temporal behavioral structures, not just the last molecular action. Not only the ingestion of 
food is to be evaluated as good, but also the behavioral sequence which led to having a meal. The 
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complication here—in comparison with representational specification models—is that ICP's do not form 
a model which represents environmental structure. The appropriate ICP structure cannot be copied from 
the environment by a perceptual process. As in the case of genes, the environment does not have the 
power to instruct appropriate codings. There has to be a different way to acquire an appropriate ICP 
structure. How this works is unclear for now, but, there are clearly possible solutions to this problem. To 
offer just one example, in work on reinforcement learning with artificial agents it is now well 
established that learning can be greatly improved by predicting future reinforcements and comparing the 
results with actual reinforcement. This allows the system to take into account a larger time-frame in 
which its actions are evaluated and changes in ICP's could be realized (Sutton, 1991).  
 There do not seem to be any intrinsic obstructions to applying the morphogenetic conceptual 
framework to behavior. The latter can be explained as a dynamical organization which expands its self-
organized order over increasingly large spatio-temporal scales by incorporating regulatory networks 
which modulate and are modulated by `stored' internal control parameters.  
 However, all this attention for the possible implementation of this interpretation entails the risk 
of neglecting the general picture. Superficially it might even seem that there are only slight changes with 
respect to the AT story. Neural ICP's could be interpreted as representations. As they are also taken to be 
a highly relevant factor for accomplishing anticipatory behavior, the outward similarity with AT's view 
on behavior could lull one into thinking that there are no fundamental differences. This is a mistake. 
Anticipatory behavior is no longer interpreted as the execution of preconceived plans. The ICP's do not 
constitute a `program' in any conventional, computer sense. The similarity exists at one specific, large-
scale organizational level. The scale oriented, dynamical view stresses that the interactions between 
dynamical processes happening at multiple spatio-temporal scales are essential for building up and 
maintaining this large-scale coordination on which the very idea of representational specification is 
based. In Section 4, I will discuss whether ICP's are `a form of representation'. First, I will be more 
specific about what it means to say that anticipatory behavior consists of a structure extending over 
multiple, increasingly large, spatio-temporal scales. 
 
 
3.5 Anticipatory behavior as a self-organized regular trajectory. 
When the morphogenetic framework is used to interpret behavioral phenomena, anticipatory behavior 
turns out to be a developmental process. This is a claim about behavior itself. It does not mean that 
behavior is the result of developmental processes, which produce a nervous system capable of 
instigating anticipatory behavior. The claim is that every action itself is literally a developmental 
process, played out on a comparatively short time scale—usually ranging from tens of milliseconds to 
seconds and minutes, but sometimes extending over hours, days or even longer. Anticipatory behavior is 
a macroscopic spatio-temporal form which is each time self-assembled anew from dynamical, self-
organizing interactions between multiple scales of organizations. Thelen and Smith say the following in 
this respect: "Each act is a new behavioral form: stable and predictable in some of its features, but 
variable, flexible, and adaptive in each instantiation." (1994, p.73). A behavioral process, from its 
beginning to its end, traverses an epigenetic pathway, that is, it proceeds in a historical and contingent 
fashion (ibid., p.142). Following Yates (1993), I will call such a self-organized trajectory a "regular 
trajectory".  
 Yates contrasts the concept of a regular trajectory with `Newtonian trajectories' (see Section 
2.2). A Newtonian trajectory is characterized by a precisely defined change in a set of variables which 
describe a system of interest. This trajectory is, in principle, endlessly repeatable by returning the system 
to the same initial state and applying the same set of changes. Industrial robots provide a good example 
of this `Newtonian' approach. These robots perform relatively complex tasks by being very precisely 
instructed at a microscopic scale. The instructions sent to the motors set the total macroscopic system in 
motion. Because of the robot's rigid make up—the motors initiate very precise changes in the joints and 
the arms are made of stiff materials and securely fastened to a firm support—these microscopic signals 
translate reliably in macroscopic movements of the robot. In this way, the specific and endlessly 
repeatable macroscopic movements are generated which are so useful in the factory. 
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 There are two kinds of problems with this approach. Firstly, many, very precise instructions are 
needed to generate the specific macroscopic effects. All the large-scale order has to be present in the 
initial description, which must rigidly control subsequent happenings. It is a bit like building a house by 
gluing together grains of sand, instead of using large pre-fab elements in which a lot of the intermediate 
structure is present in the building material itself. It is difficult to maintain the necessary control when 
the number of elements becomes large. The other problem is related to the first one. How can 
disturbances of the linear translation of microscopic instructions into macroscopic movement be dealt 
with? The large-scale dynamics of a robot's structure tends to interfere with the translation of the 
microscopic instructions into exact large-scale movements. A robot's arm might be flabby, in which case 
the instruction to put the joints in a particular position will not lead to the end of the arm being at the 
required place, at least temporally. If the robot is made more massive to prevent these disturbances, it 
will more readily show slippage. After performing the same movement many times the robot will 
wrench itself loose from its support. Such disturbances will result in a scattering around the intended 
movement result, a scattering which will have to be counteracted by keeping the robot and its 
environment as tightly constrained as possible. For these robots to work, a highly restricted and 
stereotypical environment is necessary, together with endless calibration of the machine by human 
engineers to keep it that way. It is not an attractive setup for dealing with real world environments in 
which disturbances of `normal' functioning are the rule rather than the exception. 
  In contrast, a self-organized, regular trajectory takes the existence of order at multiple scales as 
its starting-point. A regular trajectory, spanning several scales of organization, emerges when the 
dynamics at multiple scales become coupled to one another. The neural system modulates short term 
organism-environment interactions. These short-term interactions in turn modulate happenings in the 
environment on a longer time-scale, and so on. Large-scale order results from intrinsic self-organizing 
tendencies at that scale. This order is manipulated by changing control parameters within the 
microscopy. It is not specified beforehand within the microscopy. The make-up of the intervening levels 
of organization ensures a sufficient result (Section 3.3), not the specificity of the precisely instructed and 
tightly constrained Newtonian trajectory. The microscopy `uses' the intrinsic order at larger scales to 
generate the trajectory. This order (or the disturbances for a Newtonian trajectory) need or, even 
stronger, should not be suppressed or minimized. What is needed at smaller scales is a regulatory 
network which plays these self-ordering tendencies. When this works appropriately, regular trajectories 
take form. In contrast to the Newtonian ones, they are never exactly the same, never exactly repeatable. 
Each one is a historical, contingent event. 
 A way to visualize this is by thinking of circles in circles (Fentress, 1991). The dynamics 
belonging to a particular scale S(n) can be represented by a circle. This circle is in turn surrounded by a 
larger circle representing the dynamics of S(n+1), and so on (see Figure 3). The arrows represent the 
reciprocal relations between different scales. The total picture gives the image of an expanding, 
reciprocal influence of an initially small organization which subsequently manages to draw increasingly 
large-scaled dynamics into its influence. At the same time this picture can still accommodate the 
traditional image of representational specification, which turns up as a coarse view on the nested set of 
dynamical structures. When all the details of the mediating processes are kept out of view, a seemingly 
direct link between factors at the neural scale and macroscopic events will be seen. 
 
   === insert Figure 3 about here === 
 
 Despite their rough, outward resemblance, a Newtonian and a regular trajectory are very 
different. The first is a precisely defined change in a set of variables over time. The second consists of a 
change in a set of variables at S(n-1) which act as control parameters that modulate and change the 
dynamics of a set of variables at S(n), which in turn do the same for the dynamics at a scale S(n+1), and 
so on. Several sets of descriptions are needed simultaneously to keep track of this multi-level 
organization. Making this difference between Newtonian and regular trajectories implies, for example, 
that large-scale movements, as performed by industrial robots on the one hand, and humans and animals 
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on the other, reflect different organizational principles. Behavioral research should be sensitive to these 
different organizing principles behind outwardly similar behavioral phenomena. 
 Interpreting anticipatory behavior as a regular trajectory has implications for the relation 
between the neural factors—which might act as ICP's—and achieved goals. In a model based on 
representational specifications the relation between a relevant neural factor and a related external 
macroscopic state is seen as fairly direct. Both are seen as being specific to one another. The relation 
between ICP's and macroscopic structure is better characterized in terms of appropriateness and 
sufficiency. This relation is much less direct, does not draw on an abstract isomorphism or 
representation and stresses the importance of the self-organizing processes which are needed to generate 
large-scale order. Talking about a specific goal to be achieved generates the impression of a tightly 
constrained end-result. Using the concept of sufficiency changes this picture. The trajectory, as well as 
the goal itself, are now much less pinned down. In the Newtonian case, an obvious strategy would be to 
define the goal-state and back-track from there until a route to the goal is found. On the other hand, in 
the case of real behavior it is normally not necessary at all to reach a very specific goal. A variety of 
states will do, as long as they fall within a certain range. Going out for pizza does not imply that there is 
only one `good' outcome for this behavior, namely eating the piece of pizza which you actually ate. 
Innumerable slices of pizza of sufficient quality and served within a reasonable time-frame, would have 
been equally acceptable. There is only specificity after the fact: Only afterwards is it a historical truth 
that a particular piece was eaten. 
 Again, a comparison with current industrial robots is enlightening. Robots are built to perform 
tasks for human users. These users do have very specific goals in mind for their expensive robots. These 
tasks are often thought to be relatively simple, such as house-cleaning or making a tuna-sandwich. 
Given the analysis of behavior presented here, performing such specific tasks at a specific time would be 
at the upper end of behavioral complexity. These are not simple tasks at all. Behavior is rather a general 
manipulation of large-scale dynamics in ways which over many trials tends to be successful often 
enough to enhance the continuing existence of living organizations. All animals would have extreme 
difficulties with the tasks envisioned by the average roboticist. As a way of modelling behavior, 
roboticists seem to be held hostage to the commercial demands for useful robots without a sufficiently 
clear appreciation of the real problems surrounding adaptive and anticipatory behavior.  
 In summary, anticipatory behavior occurs when an embodied and situated neural system is 
capable of generating regular trajectories, which lead to a sufficient macroscopic order. Given a capacity 
for self-organized behavioral regularities at a short time-scale, a regulatory network which modulates a 
set of control parameters will be able to guide this process over longer time-scales in a way that makes it 
relatively independent of the immediate environment. It will enable the system to achieve long-term 
goals. An extended interactionist account of adaptive behavior can thus deal with problems which 
formerly necessitated representational specifications.  
 
 
4. Should behavior-related ICP's be interpreted as representations? 
This paper started out referring to a discussion between representationalists and interactionists: those 
who do and do not think that representational specifications—representations acting as an internal model 
to guide behavior—are necessary to explain the generation of behavior. There is a tendency in this 
discussion to think that the radical interactionists are making a fuss about words. One often hears 
exclamations like: "Of course Brooks' insect-robots incorporate representations. He just doesn't want to 
call them representations." These people take the existence of representations in behavioral systems as a 
definite fact. However, those interactionists who oppose the necessity for internal representational 
models do take the anti-representational case more serious than that (Keijzer & Bem, 1996). The 
interactionist claim is that representations are specific theoretical entities, that one should do without 
when trying to understand adaptive behavior. How does the morphogenetic conceptual framework bear 
on this discussion? 
 The account presented started out with an interpretation of organism-environment interaction in 
terms of scale-relations and self-organization. The concept of representation does not do any work here. 
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However, to accommodate the more representation-hungry problem anticipatory behavior a 
morphogenetic conceptual framework was introduced. This framework involves the notion of internal 
control parameters and it might look plausible to interpret these ICP's as some form of representation. 
Several properties of ICP's point in this direction. (1) Like the genetic code, behavior-related ICP's are 
definite theoretical entities which stand out from the short-term operation of the nervous system. (2) 
They also function to guide long-term behavior, just as representations do in specification accounts. (3) 
In the case of morphogenesis the genetic factor was also interpreted as a set of instructions which 
already embodied the macroscopic form. As this resulted in a very successful research-program, why 
not maintain a representational interpretation for behavior-related ICP's? 
 Are the radical interactionists then proved to be in the wrong, given the morphogenetic 
conceptual framework and the need to deal with anticipatory behavior? Well, there are also good 
arguments against interpreting ICP's as representations. Firstly, there are many conceptual differences 
between the concept of `representation' and ICP's: A representational interpretation is limited to one 
particular perspective on a multiply scaled organization. Behavioral ICP's are explicitly defined within 
the context of multiple scales of organization. To deem the two equivalent is putting to much value on 
one particular perspective on behavior. Representation is, literally, a coarse view. In contrast to 
representations ICP's are intrinsically connected to a regulatory network of which they are a part. Also, 
ICP's do not re-present external circumstances in an abstract way. Such an interpretation goes right 
against the grain of the idea of a regular trajectory. The macroscopic order is newly generated, it is not 
already encoded within the organism's ICP's.  
 Secondly, a representational interpretation could easily interfere with the morphogenetic 
conceptual framework. Equating ICP's with representations amounts to the injection of a particular set of 
thought habits into a tentative and still fragile, interactionist account of behavior. Representations are 
firmly associated with higher level concepts such as intentionality and the mental frame of reference in 
general. Interpreting ICP's as representations brings in a lot of conceptual ballast. Without it there is 
much more freedom to develop new ideas and explanations, as is now being done in embryology (see 
e.g. Nijhout, 1990). It would wrestle behavioral explanation free from the old Cartesian picture of a 
separate mind situated in the head and directing behavior. It would be a step in the direction of a much 
more natural treatment of behavioral phenomena.4 
 Finally, the sheer possibility of a representational interpretation should not be taken as a 
compelling reason to actually interpret ICP's as representations. Being able to establish a reliable 
relation between an environmental state and an ICP, or some neural state in general, does not imply that 
the latter is necessarily a symbol. Noticing that a tree rises from the ground up to a noticeable height 
does not make it a tower. Trees and towers are different things, even though they share certain 
properties. The representationalists seem to claim that everything within the nervous system which 
covaries with external factors has to be a representation. The counterargument is simple. Why couldn't 
we be more discriminative than that? 
 Given these arguments pro and con, does the morphogenetic conceptual framework feature 
representations or not? My own judgement would be a denial. The concept of `ICP' is definitely not the 
same as that of `representation'. It would be a sensible policy to signal this change by a change of 
vocabulary. But then, like the defenders of the representational view are wont to say: why make a fuss 
about words? It is the concepts behind the label that matter. I would thus be happy to oblige anyone who 
wants to uphold that ICP's are `some form of representation'. The real issues lie after all with the ideas 
behind the label.  
 The presented conceptual framework, with its ideas imported from embryology, expands the 
interactionist account of behavior in a way which enables it to explain the occurrence of anticipatory 
behavior—at least, in theory. The thing being offered so far is, of course, only an idea, an alternative, 
very general, conceptual structure for thinking about the organizing principles behind adaptive and 
anticipatory behavior. Its validity will depend on its usefulness as a source for more concrete ideas 
concerning the origins of behavior. Empirical research and the development of more elaborate and 
concrete models of behavior will have to decide on that. Still, the intrinsically good thing about this 
framework, come what may, is that it focusses attention where it should be: onto the mediating 
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processes which actually generate behavior. Morphogenesis is a phenomenon where a lot of solid facts 
concerning its biochemical, genetic, cellular and topological organization eventually led to a more 
general understanding of this process. The promise is that it offers a theoretical lead to direct our 
attention to those facts which are central to the organization of behavior. 
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Notes. 
1  Both the interactionist and the regular cognitive explanation are to be opposed to behaviorism. 
Behaviorism is concerned with regular ways to shape existing behavior into forms which have 
specific (e.g. adaptive and anticipatory) characteristics. The discussion here focusses on the 
organization required to generate any adaptive, anticipatory behavior at all. Not on how it is 
changed by learning.  
2 Both Goodwin and Kauffman are proponents of a so-called `developmental tradition' in biology 
(Resnik, 1994; Griffiths, 1996). The account sketched here is in agreement with this tradition. 
Sometimes the developmental tradition is held to be in opposition to the classical neo-darwinian 
position (Dennett, 1995). The developmentalists argue that not all order which is present in 
living nature is the result of selection. For example, Kauffman remarks that lipid membranes, 
which provide such useful cell boundaries, do not originate in genetic instructions. Lipid 
membranes are a physical phenomenon and they come for free under the proper circumstances 
(Kauffman, 1993). However, acknowledging the importance of self-ordering principles in living 
nature does not in any way detract from the importance of selection as a crucial factor in 
generating order (ibid.). I would like to follow Depew and Weber's (1995) lead and hold that the 
dynamical view could form a refinement and extension of darwinian ideas, similarly to how 
mendelian genetics and the statistical approach to population genetics formed the `modern 
synthesis' of neo-darwinism. There is no reason to posit any deep disagreement with basic 
darwinian insights. 
3 Notice that Kelso gives an intentional interpretation to these parametric influences and uses the 
word `specific' in this context. For Kelso this is a way to combine self-organizing systems with 
intentionality. However, it is strange to interpret intentionality as a factor coming from outside 
the system under description, and imposing its intended order on that system as some 
mysterious force. To me it makes more sense to interpret ICP's as non-intentional, non-specific 
(but appropriate) control parameters, and to think of intentionality as a higher-level property that 
applies to an intelligent system as a whole (Keijzer, 1997; see also note 4). 
4 The last suggestion might raise a very fundamental worry with this approach: Is it not a way 
towards a full reduction of the mind, and the loss of everything which makes us special as 
sentient and rational beings set apart from a merely mechanical and material world? This worry 
has certainly been a prime motivation for maintaining representations within behavioral 
explanation (Fodor, 1981; 1987; Dretske, 1988). Given a multiply scaled perspective on the 
world, the fear seems to be for a catastrophe which is not coming anyway. There are many 
levels or scales of organization. Nature is more than `just' physical processes. It involves 
chemical-, geological-, biological-, psychological and sociological processes as well, to name a 
few. Behavior and the mind seem to be firmly entrenched phenomena within the scalar 
hierarchy. Both are readily interpreted as higher levels of organization, the occurrence of which 
should be explainable by lower-level processes. Making mental concepts part of a lower-level 
explanation of anticipatory behavior does not make the mind more real than it would be on its 
own accord. It only threatens to make behavioral explanation less tractable. 
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